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The Canada-U.S.  trade negotiations, initiated in September,  1985,
are important to Canada's economy as a whole and to Canadian agri-
culture. Canada's desire to open up and guarantee access to the giant
U.S.  market  is motivated by the  opportunity  to create  a more  effi-
cient Canadian economy that can compete in world markets.
Trade is crucial to Canada and especially to Canadian agriculture.
The importance  of trade varies by commodity  and this variation  is
the result  of both  comparative  advantage  and  Canada's trade  and
domestic agricultural policies. Consequently, Canadian-U.S. trade re-
lationships would be  expected  to vary  by commodity as would solu-
tions to conflicts in the cases  in which they arise.
The Importance of Trade
The  Canadian  economy  is highly integrated  into the world econ-
omy. Canada exports more  per person than any other developed  na-
tion  (Table  1).  In  Canada,  exports  account  for  approximately  30
percent  of the gross national product  (GNP),  contrasted with about
10  percent  for  the  United  States.  Canada  and the  United  States
share the world's largest trading relationship. Ontario alone imports
more from the United States than does Japan ($56.3 billion in 1985).
Table 1. Canada's Trade
1986 (C$  bil.)
Exports  Imports
Total  U.S.  Percent  Total  U.S.  Percent
$120  $93  77  $112  $77  69
Source:  Trade Negotiations: Securing Canada's  Future. External  Affairs.
Canada. Cat. No. E74-12/1-1987.
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Canadian  agriculture  is  trade  driven.  Exports  of  farm  and  food
products  account  for  approximately  one  half of total farm cash  re-
ceipts.  Currently,  the  United  States  is  Canada's  largest  and  most
diverse trading partner in farm and food products (Table 2).
Table 2. Canada's Agricultural Trade
1985 (C$ bil.)
Exports  Imports
Total  U.S.  Percent  Total  U.S.  Percent
$8.9  $2.4  27  $5.7  $3.4  60
Source: Canada's Trade in Agricultural Products. 1985, Agriculture  Canada
Trade Relationships
When  Canada trades  in international  markets,  it is essentially  a
price  taker.  Although  Canada  exports  a substantial  portion  of its
domestic  production,  these  exports  account  for  a  small  portion  of
world  production.  For  example,  Canada  exports  approximately  80
percent  of its wheat production, but accounts  for only 4.5  percent of
the world's production.  Thus, it can sell its wheat at the world price.
In the  trade  literature,  Canada  would be  referred  to  as a "small"
country, one that doesn't affect the world  price by trading more.
In contrast,  when the United  States  trades in international  mar-
kets it affects prices. The United States may export a smaller portion
of its domestic production, but since this amount usually accounts for
a  much  larger  portion  of world  production,  an  increase  in exports
puts  downward  pressure  on  world  prices.  For  example,  the  United
States  exports  approximately  25  percent  of its domestic  feedgrain
production  and  U.S.  production  accounts  for  about  30  percent  of
world production.  Thus it is difficult  for the United States to trade
more  or less feedgrains without  affecting  world prices. In the trade
literature,  the United States is a "large" country.
When the United States and Canada  are "free"  to trade with each
other,  U.S. actions have a larger effect on North American prices and
trade flows than Canadian actions. We think of the pricing relation-
ship in terms described by Figure  1.
Since the United States is a "large" country and Canada a "small"
one, Canadian products are priced relative to U.S. products. The ver-
tical axis measures prices for a standard unit (in Canadian currency).
The  horizontal  axis measures  quantities,  produced,  consumed  and
traded in a standardized unit. For products that can be traded,  the
Canadian price is above or below the U.S. price (Pus) by no more than
transfer costs.
158The  segment Dd represents Canada's domestic demand  for  a com-
modity. If the Canadian price differs from the U.S. price by less than
transfer costs (the Canadian price, which  is given by the kinked de-
mand curve,  minus the U.S. price), then Canadian product is priced
on the domestic  demand curve.







The  segment  Di represents Canada's  import ceiling. If the Cana-
dian price exceeds the U.S price by more than transfer costs, Canada
will import from the United States. However, if Canada can buy more
cheaply  in world  markets,  it will import from countries  other than
the United States. For example,  Canada and the United States both
import bananas.
The  last segment  De represents  the export  floor. If the Canadian
price  falls  below the  U.S.  price  by  more than  the cost  of transfer,
Canada  will  export  to the  United  States.  If Canada  can  obtain  a
higher price in world markets, it will export to countries other than
the United  States. This situation  occurs for grains. Since both Can-
ada  and the United  States  are  surplus in  grains,  both compete  in
world export markets and the average price in Canada may be above
or below the U.S. price.
The  "model"  described  with  Figure  1 can  be used  to  generalize
about relative prices for major Canadian  commodity groups. This is
done in Figure 2. As we will see, most agricultural products fall into
one  of these three  categories.  The nature  of price relationships  for
these three categories, in conjunction with Canada's status as a price
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ments we apply.
Since  Canada  is  a  small  country,  its  agricultural  policies  have
mainly  been concerned  with transferring  income  to  producers  and
not removing  resources  from  production.  It would be the  height  of
folly for Canada to act unilaterally in developing set aside programs
and the like.  Conversely,  the status of the United States as a large
country  allows  it to  consider  policies  that  remove  resources  from
production. These types of programs,  such as acreage  diversion pro-
grams,  have been the  cornerstone  of U.S.  farm  programs  in recent
decades.
Canada's natural competitiveness  in certain products enables it to
export.  Not surprisingly, these  commodities are  the least protected.
This  group includes  grains and the red  meat complex commodities
and accounts for nearly 60 percent of the gross farm output value. In
terms of Figure  2,  livestock  are  priced on the export floor.  For  live-
stock and red meats, the U.S. market is an important export destina-
tion. In 1985, approximately 90 percent of live animal exports and 70
percent  of meat exports  went to the United States.  Since Canadian
grain  competes  in world markets with that produced in the United
States, the Canadian price may be above or below the U.S. price. Less
than 10  percent  of Canadian  grain,  oilseed  and associated  product
exports go to the United  States.
Figure  2: Pricing of Selected Agricultural Products
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160Canada's  supply managed,  or fully protected,  commodities,  dairy
products and eggs and poultry, comprise approximately 20 percent of
the gross value of Canada's farm output and are priced on the domes-
tic demand  curve.  Prices  are based  on cost  of production  formulae,
above the import ceiling,  and on the domestic demand curve.
Another group of commodities  can be considered  as partially pro-
tected.  Within  this  group there  are  several  commodities  that  are
priced  on  the  import  ceiling.  This  subgroup  includes  wines  and
grapes and fruits and vegetables.
Canadian Agricultural Policies
Canada's major policy instruments, as they apply to the least pro-
tected, partially protected and fully protected or supply managed sec-
tors of the Canadian agricultural sector, are discussed below.
Least Protected: Grains and Livestock
Canada's livestock (red meats) sector is more market oriented than
any other agricultural sector, but is the object of several public poli-
cies. Stabilization, marketing boards, public goods and the Meat Im-
port Act constitute the major instruments used in this sector.
Livestock Stabilization.  Stabilization policy for beef and pork is cur-
rently in a state  of change.  Until  1986, beef cattle and  hogs were
covered by the provisions of the Agricultural Stabilization Act (ASA)
of 1975.  This act obliged the federal  government to make deficiency
payments to producers  in a year when the average  market price is
less than 90 percent of the previous five years, adjusted for changes
in cash costs. The programs operated with several rule changes dur-
ing their lives, but for the most part the amount of future price guar-
antee was  not know  in advance  and any payments were  made  well
after the end of the year. Due to dissatisfaction with the ASA, several
provinces initiated their own  stabilization  programs to supplement
the ASA. These programs  vary in operation, but some trigger defi-
ciency payments with cost of production formulas; others use histori-
cal price relationships.  Most are partially financed by producers.
The Tripartite Red  Meat  Program was developed  in order to  deal
with  problems  associated  with  these  provincial  "top-loading"  pro-
grams and  to  insure that  the  intent  of the  ASA  is met,  i.e.,  that
market signals get through to producers.  The Tripartite  Program is
based on a margin guarantee rather than a price or income guaran-
tee. It covers production up to the level of domestic consumption only.
The federal and provincial governments and producers share in fund-
ing. It is voluntary on behalf of producers. The program is tailored to
five  individual  commodities.  Slaughter  cattle,  backgrounders  and
hogs and  sheep  are  eligible  for quarterly  payments  if the average
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moving average for that quarter. The cow-calf program is similar, but
payments  are annual and based on a ten-year moving  average.
Marketing Boards for Hogs. All but one  province has a marketing
board, commission or cooperative  for selling hogs. The hog boards or
commissions use either electronic  auctions to establish prices or for-
mulas with prices in other major  Canadian and U.S.  markets.  None
of these  "agencies"  exercises supply  management powers.  All of the
boards are made  up of producers  elected  by producers to operate  on
behalf of producers.  Some of the provincial  "agencies"  are involved
in export sales and product promotion.
Meat Import Act.  The  Canadian  Meat  Import Act  provides  for  in-
voking import quotas on beef if imports exceed the average level dur-
ing  1971-75,  with  an annual  adjustment.  It is like  the  U.S.  Meat
Import Law  since it incorporates  counter-cyclical  supply provisions;
when domestic  supplies  of beef decrease,  import quotas expand. The
act has been used only once, in 1985, against the European  Economic
Community  (EEC) and never against the United States.
Grain Transportation. Canada's  grain  sector,  although essentially
market oriented,  is the object of several  public policies.
Transportation  assistance  is provided to the grain sector with two
major  instruments,  the Western  Grain  Transportation  Act (WGTA)
and the Feed Freight Assistance Program  for provinces.
Under the WGTA,  grains  are moved from the Prairie  provinces to
the Great  Lakes and Pacific Coast at legislated low  rates. Railways
are  paid the  difference  between  legislated  rates and the estimated
market rate, plus a portion of future increases in costs.
Feedgrains  moved  from  the Prairies  to  Quebec,  Atlantic Canada
and  British  Columbia  are  subsidized  up  to  C$15  million annually
under the Feed Freight Assistance Program.  In addition, the federal
government  contributes  to  the  maintenance  and  rehabilitation  of
railway branch lines and purchases of equipment.
The  WGTA has its roots in Confederation  when the Western prov-
inces  were  induced  to become part  of Canada  with  guaranteed  low
transport  rates  for Prairie  grain.  Feed  Freight  Assistance  was  ini-
tially introduced to help Eastern Canadian farmers produce meat for
the British and Canadian effort during World  War II.
Canadian Wheat Board. The  Canadian Wheat  Board  (CWB) is  a
federal crown corporation that attempts to maximize producer  earn-
ings for certain grains (wheat, oats and barley) grown in the Prairie
provinces (the CWB area); provide equitable access to markets for all
producers; and provide some measure of price stability. The CWB has
several  powers  at  its disposal.  It is  the only  marketing  outlet  for
Prairie wheat, barley and oats traded interprovincially  and interna-
tionally,  and  it  licenses  imports  of wheat,  oats,  barley  and  other
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the CWB. It provides for "price pooling"  for wheat, oats and barley.
Producers receive a delivery quota that may be increased during the
crop year. An initial payment is made on the amount under delivery
quota once  the CWB has an indication of what the average  pooled
price to Canadian producers will be. Interim and final payments are
made if average pooled returns exceed the value  of initial payments.
In addition, wheat sold for domestic consumption  is assured a mini-
mum price of C$7 per bushel under Canada's Two-Price Wheat Plan.
Western  Grain Stabilization Act.  The Western  Grain Stabilization
Act is designed to protect producers from instability in prices without
distorting  market signals.  Payments  are  made when the total cash
flow  from the  sale of seven grains (wheat,  oats, barley,  feed wheat,
flax, canola and rye) in a particular year declines below the average
of the previous five years. The federal government contributes 4 per-
cent of gross sales revenue from Prairie grains. Farmers who choose
to participate pay a premium of 2 percent of their revenue from grain
sales up to $60,000 annually. Payments are made on the basis of the
weighted average price of all seven grains, thus there is an incentive
to  produce  the  grain  that is  expected  to  yield the  highest  profit.
Grains and oilseeds grown in Eastern Canada and outside the CWB
area are eligible for stabilization payments made under the national
Agricultural Stabilization Act of 1975.
Livestock and Grains: Public Goods. A variety  of public  good  type
programs  are used in the livestock and grain sectors including grad-
ing,  Record of Performance,  publicly  funded research and health  in-
spection.
Canada's  grain  grading  system  is  operated  under  the  Canada
Grains  Act. The  act  specifies precise  classifications  and procedures
for handling  grains.  The  high  grade  standards  maintained  by the
system allow Canadian wheat to be sold at a premium in world mar-
kets.  The  Canadian  grain  grading  system  is  essentially  a  public
good; one that would not have evolved in the absence of government
involvement.
Grading  of livestock  is carried  out pursuant to  the federal  Live-
stock  Grading  Program  and  the  Agricultural  Products  Standards
Act.  For  hogs,  carcasses receive  an index number representing the
quantity  of meat  in the carcass based  on its backfat  in relation to
weight.  The  beef system  is similar,  but less  precise.  Grading  pro-
grams benefit consumers  as well as producers  since they result in a
higher quality product.
Federal-provincial  Record  of Performance  programs  are  designed
to  measure  genetic  traits  that  are  economically  important  and
aid breeding decisions. Agriculture Canada,  provincial governments
and  universities  conduct  research  on  most  agricultural  and  food
commodities.
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Several  policy instruments, often grouped under "orderly  market-
ing" policies,  are used in the horticultural sector.
Some of these instruments are among the most contentious  in Ca-
nadian agriculture.  For example,  provincial liquor boards typically
control  which  products are listed,  the allocation  of shelf space  and
the  price  markup.  Generally,  markups  on  wines  produced  in  the
province are lower than on imported wines. Similarly, most provinces
have sourcing requirements to qualify for these markups.
Many  Canadian  fruits  and  vegetables  are  protected  by  seasonal
tariffs. These tariffs are imposed at different levels at different times
of the year and are applied on a regional basis, because the growing
season for horticultural crops varies. The general intent of these tar-
iffs  is to protect  local  growers  from  declining  prices  due  to earlier
harvests further south.  Of Canada's tariffs on fruits and vegetables,
twenty-two  are  higher  than  in the  United  States,  twenty-two  are
lower  and nine  are the  same (Harling et  al., Chap.  4,  p.  2).  Some
horticultural  commodities  are  also  eligible  for  stabilization  pay-
ments under the ASA.
Among the instruments designed to aid in the "orderly marketing"
of horticultural crops  are grading  requirements,  shipping container
standards and retail packaging and labeling standards.
International and interprovincial shipments of fresh and processed
produce  cannot  be  made  in  bulk  containers  without  Agricultural
Products Board permission.  This essentially  stops shipments to sur-
plus areas.
Canada  allows only specific  container  sizes for canned  and frozen
fruits  and  vegetables.  This  prohibits  spot  selling  of some  canned
goods produced  in the United States.  Generally,  frozen  product  can
move  freely because it is shipped in larger  containers and then re-
packaged.  Product sold in glass containers must be in metric sizes. In
addition, according to the Consumer Packaging and Labeling Act, all
products  sold in Canada must bear a bilingual, French and English,
label.
Fully Protected: Supply Management
The production  of dairy  products,  poultry  and  eggs  is geared to
Canadian  demand.  This  involves  managing  domestic  supplies  and
imports.  Production  quotas are  used to limit supply to the  amount
demanded  at a formula-determined  selling price.  In order to main-
tain this price, import quotas are  required. Basic  import quotas for
poultry have been negotiated at a fairly low percentage  of Canada's
domestic production.
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system,  Canada's  industrial  milk  producers  consistently  receive
large federal transfers.
The Main Conflicts
Several  trade disputes between  the United States and Canada  in
recent years indicate which elements  of Canadian  and U.S. agricul-
tural policy are likely to be sources of conflict between the two coun-
tries. Others have not been the subject of disputes.
Canadian Policies
Stabilization. The  1985 "Hogs and Pork from Canada" dispute  in-
dicates that the United  States interprets  stabilization  programs  as
providing countervailable  subsidies. Under U.S. trade law, a program
is deemed to be countervailable  if it fails the specificity test, i.e., if it
is provided to a specific industry or group of industries.  The issue of
whether  a program provides  a subsidy  in the economic  sense is not
important  in U.S.  law.  But in trade  negotiations this issue must be
addressed.  Canada's  WGSA and  ASA, including  the Tripartite  Red
Meat Program, do not provide an economic subsidy since they do not
induce a production response (Martin and Goddard). The reasons are
that payments  are retroactive, the amount of the future price guar-
antee  is not  known  and  payments  are  received  too  late.  However,
some  of the provincial  stabilization  programs for hogs may provide
economic subsidies and induce a supply response, thereby distorting
natural patterns  of production among Canadian provinces.
Public Goods.  The  "Hogs  and  Pork  from  Canada"  case  also  in-
dicates  the United States may interpret several of Canada's public-
good-type programs as providing unacceptable subsidies. If the speci-
ficity  test  is  used  to  determine  which  Canadian  programs  are
acceptable  to the  United  States,  then  federal-provincial  Record  of
Performance  programs  may  be  viewed  as  unacceptable  subsidies
because  only beef, dairy cattle,  sheep, poultry and honey  and honey
bees  are  eligible.  However,  grading  programs  may  be  viewed  as
acceptable  because  "numerous  agricultural  products  are  similarly
graded,"  including  grains  (U.S.  International  Trade  Commission,
1985).  This is inconsistent.  Both types  of programs are available to
suitable  commodities.  Both provide  public goods  and do  not induce
the production response  required  for an economic  subsidy.  The  per-
versity of the specificity test makes it impossible to use in defining
what  constitutes  an  acceptable  subsidy  in  Canada-U.S.  trade
negotiations.
Supply Management. Some of the practices  associated with supply
management,  such as import quotas, production quotas and market
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Although these  are technically  legal under the General  Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the United States may insist that Can-
ada relax its import quotas in order to gain some  access to the Cana-
dian market.  Provided that the United States  gains some access  to
the  Canadian  market,  it is unlikely to  insist  that Canada remove
supply management  completely. Also, because the United States in-
tervenes in some of these sectors,  dairy for example,  it may be will-
ing to accept supply management, perhaps with sliding import levies
instead of import quotas.
Transportation  Assistance. Public assistance provided to transport-
ing Canadian agricultural products is unlikely to be tolerated by the
United  States,  especially  for  grain.  Canada  and the United  States
compete  in world grain markets.  Therefore, the United States is un-
likely to accept  continued use of a transportation  subsidy on an ex-
port  oriented  commodity.  However,  potential  losses  to  Western
producers  could be  offset  by gaining  more  efficient  access  to world
markets through the Mississippi and Columbia-Snake river systems.
Canadian Wheat Board. The  monopoly/monopsony  powers  of the
CWB  may not be acceptable  in  principle  to the  United States but,
since  "price  pooling"  and  "delivery  quotas"  do  not distort interna-
tional prices, the Canadian system may be perceived as being prefer-
able to others  such  as the  EEC's. Consequently  these  instruments
are not likely to cause a conflict.  However, Canada will be pressured
to abandon  its two-price  wheat  policy  and  its practice  of licensing
grain imports.
Discriminatory Practices: Wines and Grapes. Discriminatory  pro-
curement,  markup,  listing  and domestic  content legislation  in the
Canadian wine industry  is not likely to be  tolerated  by the United
States.  Wines imported from the United States and other countries
would sell better if the current Canadian policy was dismantled.  In
addition, Canadian consumers  would probably  appreciate  it.
Orderly Marketing Instruments: Selected Horticultural  Crops. Can-
ada's  domestic  labeling,  packaging  and  shipping  container  regula-
tions are likely to be perceived as nontariff barriers to U.S. products.
This may be correct in some cases, but certainly not all.
Other. Seasonal tariffs on selected fruits and vegetables may cause
minor conflicts. Seasonal tariffs probably  will be viewed as discrimi-
nating against U.S. products since they are imposed before the peak
of the Canadian harvest,  which coincides with the peak in U.S.  sup-
plies. The Meat Import Act is not likely to cause a conflict since it is
similar to the U.S. Meat Import Law.
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Selected  U.S.  agricultural  policy  instruments  also  are  likely  to
cause  conflicts  between  the United  States and Canada.  The  provi-
sions  of the 1985  U.S. farm bill are  the best example.  This was the
issue in the  recent countervailing  duty action brought  against the
United States by the Ontario Corn Producers'  Association  in "Corn
from the U.S.A."  Since the United States accounts for a large propor-
tion  of world corn  production,  the target price  of $3.03  induced  an
increase  in world  corn production  despite  payment  limitations  and
acreage set-aside provisions.  This increase in production resulted  in
lower world corn prices from which U.S. producers were insulated via
deficiency payments  ($1.84). But, since Canadian corn  producers re-
ceive  the world price,  they were adversely affected  by the U.S.  farm
bill. The status of the United States as a large country in world grain
markets  implies  that its  policy  actions  will  affect  Canadian  pro-
ducers.  This  reality  also  accounts  for the impacts  of the  EEC-U.S.
agricultural subsidy war on other Canadian grain producers, and the
subsequent necessity  of the Special Canadian  Grains Program that
was announced in 1986.
U.S. Trade Law Practices
Two aspects  of the current  U.S.  trade law system are  particularly
"loathsome" to Canadians.  The U.S. system is essentially concerned
with placing tariffs on imports, fair and unfair imports alike. Several
statutes that can  be  used  to "block"  imports are  available to  U.S.
producers and most of the proceedings  can be started only by a peti-
tion  from U.S.  producers.  The legal  requirements  to have  a formal
investigation  initiated  are  burdensome  and  once  the investigation
begins,  the onus  of proof  is on  foreign  exporters.  In addition,  one
statute enables U.S. producers  to have their initial research paid for
by the government  while foreign  exporters  must pay for their own
research  and  legal  counsel.  Thus,  there  are  considerable  costs  in-
volved  for foreign exporters who attempt to protect themselves from
harassing, rent-seeking behavior by U.S. producers.
US.  Countervailing Duty Law. The  test used  to determine  what
constitutes a countervailable  subsidy and the conditions required to
impose a countervailing  duty are the major complaints that Canadi-
ans have about  U.S. countervailing  duty law.
First, under U.S. law, a program is deemed to confer a countervaila-
ble  subsidy if it is available to  a specific  industry  or enterprise  or
group of industries or enterprises.  The issue of whether the program
confers an economic subsidy, a movement  up or a shift in the supply
curve,  is not addressed.  Ironically,  some Canadian  agricultural  pro-
grams  have  been  classified  as  countervailable  by the U.S.  Depart-
ment  of Commerce  because  they  are  targeted  at  specific  types  of
producers in order to limit potential supply responses.
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U.S.  law the existence  of a subsidy, as defined by U.S. law, and eco-
nomic  injury to domestic  producers of the "like good"  are sufficient
conditions for imposing a countervailing duty. The third requirement
that is spelled out in the  1979  GATT Agreement  on Subsidies  and
Countervailing  Duties, that there be  a causal link between the sub-
sidy and the injury, is not present in U.S. law.
Options: Bilateral Negotiations
Certain  instruments  of Canadian  agricultural  policy  are  open  to
negotiation with the United States. Probably this is the case for U.S.
policy instruments  also.  The  policy  instruments  currently used  by
the United States  and  Canada  could be  grouped  into mutually  ac-
ceptable,  mutually  nonacceptable  and  contestable  instruments  by
the two negotiating teams.  Canada and the United States could con-
tinue to use mutually acceptable instruments and would refrain from
using mutually nonacceptable  instruments. Special provisions proba-
bly would have to be made for the phasing out of mutually nonaccept-
able programs.
The  contestable  instruments  could  be  dealt  with in  one  of three
ways.  One  possibility  is to  use  a quantitative  measure,  such  as a
producer  subsidy  equivalent  (PSE),  of the  total amount  of subsidy
provided for a commodity in both countries, calculating the net sub-
sidy and countervailing the country with the higher subsidy by the
difference.
The second possibility is to harmonize the existing contingent pro-
tection laws in both the United States and Canada by adding to U.S.
law the provisions that already exist in the GATT Subsidies Code;  a
test for causality.  If the United States insisted that the existence of a
causal link among the subsidy, the increase in exports and injury to
domestic producers of that product be proved before  a countervailing
duty was  imposed,  then the  current  dispute  settlement  mechanism
could be followed.
The third alternative is to harmonize the two countries' contingent
protection  laws and establish  a joint commission with  the power to
make binding  decisions. From  our point  of view the latter option  is
preferable.  Measurements  such  as  PSEs  and  their  contemporaries
are riddled  with  difficulties  and  each  of these  concepts  has limita-
tions. The joint commission route would allow the economic analysis
that is pertinent to the market to be conducted.  It would also insure
that trade disputes are divorced from politicians.
Canada would insist that the following policies be included in the
group  of mutually  acceptable  subsidies  for  the  following  reasons.
Canada  would  insist  on  maintaining  true  stabilization  programs
such as the Western Grain Stabilization  Act and Agricultural Stabi-
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ipated changes in price movements but do not distort market signals
or  induce  a  supply  response.  Other  "so-called"  stabilization  pro-
grams, such as many of the provincial hog programs, likely would be
mutually nonacceptable.
Canada probably  will  insist  on maintaining  certain instruments
used in the grain sector. The price pooling and delivery quota system
of the CWB is not likely to be an issue because it is not trade distort-
ing. The United States probably would insist that transportation sub-
sidies, two-price wheat policy and import licensing, be eliminated.
Canada would  insist  on continuing  programs  that provide  public
goods such as grading and inspection, research, extension, education,
market information and health and safety standards. The U.S. proba-
bly would agree that these programs are mutually acceptable.
Canada's  supply management programs  present a  dilemma;  how-
ever, the United States is almost certain to insist that Canada modify
the import quotas that accompany the production quotas and market
sharing features of supply management.
Ideally, programs  such as the  1985  U.S. farm bill, and others that
have  the  effect  of  driving  down  international  commodity  prices,
should not be used by the United States. It is unreasonable to expect
the  United  States  to  refrain  from  subsidizing  its  grain  producers
when the EEC continues to  do so.  The United States and the EEC
must realize that as "large countries" their actions may do irrepara-
ble harm to small trade dependent  countries  such as Canada.  This
issue  can only  be satisfactorily  settled  in the multilateral  negotia-
tions.
But  the United  States can be fair in the  application of its trade
laws and this would help Canadian exporters and the Canadian agri-
cultural sector a great deal. Many features of U.S. trade law could be
amended to make it  less of a rent-seeking  system, but the counter-
vailing duty statute is the most important  to Canadian agriculture.
First, the United States should adopt an economic definition of sub-
sidy.  The  current  legal  definitions  are  not  useful  in  determining
which foreign programs cause potential injury to U.S. producers.
Second, the United States should use a causality test to determine
whether countervailing  duties should be imposed on foreign exports.
Causality is present by definition for export subsidies, but for domes-
tic programs the issue of whether the subsidy caused an increase  in
exports,  and ultimately injury to U.S. producers, must be considered
explicitly.  This would be consistent with the 1979 GATT Agreement
on Subsidies and Countervailing  Duties.
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